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Abstract:  
The paper investigates the relationship between human capital characteristics and firm performance 
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INTRODUCTION 
A professional service firm’s knowledge embodied in human capital is central for 
explaining its performance. This paper is concerned with human capital 
characteristics  in particular with the composition of professionals’ educational 
background  and how such characteristics’ affect firms’ economic performance in 
terms of productivity and profitability. Authors increasingly argue that human 
resources are not only important, but among the strategically most crucial resources 
(Itami & Roehl, 1987; Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Ulrich & Lake, 1991; Spender, 
1993; Lei & Hitt, 1995; Mahoney, 1995; Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Pennings, Lee, & 
Witteloostuijn, 1998; Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001). However, it is not 
entirely clear how human resources matter for firm performance. While the role of 
heterogeneity of firms’ top-management for firm behavior and firm performance has 
been discussed and studied rather extensively in the existing literature (see for 
instance, Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Murray, 1989; Thomas, 
Litschert, & Ramaswamy, 1991; Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Hambrick, Seung Cho, & 
Chen, 1996), very little has been done on the importance of the skill composition in a 
service firm’s knowledge pool.1 This paper analyzes the importance of educational 
diversity of professionals for firm performance in a highly knowledge intensive 
service industry, namely engineering consulting. 
 We also examine two additional aspects of the relation between human capital 
and performance. One aspect is the role of the level of a firm’s human capital in terms 
of employee’s experience and tenure. The other additional aspect of human capital is 
how human capital compensation varies with tenure and professional experience. We 
argue that this aspect is an important explanatory factor in determining firm 
performance in knowledge-intensive service industries.  
In our empirical analysis, we shall make use of a unique dataset, which contains 
annual, linked data on the total population of employees and establishments in 
engineering firms in Denmark from 1980 onwards. It includes characteristics of 
establishments and employees as well as flow data on establishment and employee 
mobility/turnover on an annual basis. We shall make use of the fact that in the 
database, employees are characterized by detailed data on formal education.  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section (“Theory 
and Hypotheses”) contains a theoretical discussion of the issues involved and a 
formulation of the hypotheses to be tested in the empirical section of the paper.  
Subsequently, we describe the data, variables, and estimation technique used in the 
analysis (“Methods”), followed by a section containing the estimation of the empirical 
model (“Results”). The final section (“Discussion and Conclusion”) contains a wider 
discussion of the results and makes several suggestions for future research. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
In choosing our research setting  engineering consulting firms  we follow recent 
studies (e.g. Pennings et al., 1998; Richard, 2000; Hitt et al., 2001) which utilize the 
fact that a striking feature of service organizations is their persuasive reliance on 
knowledge embodied in their human capital. Because there is “…close connection 
between knowledge possessed by the personnel of the firm and the services 
obtainable…” (Penrose, 1959: 77), we suggest that an engineering consulting firm’s 
performance is inextricably linked to the properties of its human resource pool. 
We pursue two arguments on how human capital characteristics and pay policies 
co-determine performance in service firms. The first argument relates to the 
conceptualization and operationalization of a service firm’s knowledge stock. In 
knowledge-intensive service firms, such as engineering consultancies, knowledge is a 
key resource (e.g. Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) and contributes to explaining a 
firm’s rent creation (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 
1996; Quinn & Finkelstein, 1996; Pennings et al., 1998; Hitt et al., 2001). We focus 
on how levels of human capital experience and educational diversity affect an 
engineering firm’s performance. The second argument deals with the performance 
implications of service firms’ pay policies in terms of the compensation firms pay for 
their human capital. Because monitoring in knowledge intensive work is notoriously 
difficult, a service firm’s pay policy creates incentives for knowledge workers through 
rent-sharing arrangements (e.g. Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984; Lazear, 1991; Yellen, 1995).  
More precisely, we will discuss reasons to expect higher pay levels and steeper pay 
profiles across experience and tenure to be positively related to performance.  
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Experience Levels and Performance 
This paper deals with the performance impact of two types of professional experience 
embodied in human capital – general experience and firm-specific experience. 
General experience is defined as the professional experience the employees got since 
entering the labor market, while firm-specific experience refers to experience 
obtained by the employees within their current firm. Both types of experience-based 
knowledge is valuable to the extent that it contributes to a firm’s competitive 
advantage by improving efficiency and effectiveness, exploiting opportunities, or 
neutralizing threats (Barney, 1991; Lado, Boyd, & Wright, 1992). Several studies 
suggest that firm-specific experience (e.g. Becker, 1962; Pennings et al., 1998) which 
is by definition not readily available to competitors may provide a potential source of 
increased performance (Barney, 1991; Snell, Youndt, & Wright, 1996). High levels of 
general as well as firm-specific experience seem also particularly important in service 
industries since consulting services are ultimately experience goods, where clients 
select providers according to personal reputation (Maister, 1993). If clients screen 
engineering services based on the reputation of the human capital of the firms (Arrow, 
1973; Maister, 1993), high levels of experience are clearly an advantage in winning 
contracts. To the extent that an engineering firm endowed with high levels of 
experience can produce more consistent, reliable, and high quality services, the 
likelihood of retaining and winning new clients in the firm’s current market is 
increased (e.g. Pennings et al., 1998). 
Development of experience is often path-dependent (Itami & Roehl, 1987), and 
may require the combination of various sorts of tacit skills, routines, and cultural 
knowledge in a particular engineering firm’s context (Winter, 1987; Galunic & 
Rjordan, 1998). While high levels of experience-based knowledge can contribute to 
performance as long as the context remains unchanged, it is also signified by limited 
options for productive re-utilization in novel contexts. If engineering firms attempt to 
win new clients outside the firm’s core business and try to develop new services, the 
value of current experiences diminishes. For example, experience acquired in one 
engineering project, for instance in bridge construction in terms of knowledge of rules 
of conduct; key players; common sales practices; design challenges etc., might be of 
limited use  if not misleading  in another project such as port facility design. 
Likewise, firm-specific experience about a particular client firm’s culture and rules 
  
4
 
might be of limited use  if not harmful  when applied to another client’s working 
context. 
 Matusik & Hill (1998) further suggest that if general and firm-specific experience 
becomes obsolete, inflow of external experience may help to update a firm’s 
knowledge stock. Matusik (2002) empirically shows that unique combinations of 
updated general experience and firm-specific experience may lead to unique firm 
positioning in novel output markets. However, engineers switching to a new employer 
often need to go through a firm-specific education process (e.g. concerning work 
procedures, culture, norms typical to that firm), before they can productively employ 
their knowledge and professional skills (Penrose, 1959). In addition, as March (1991) 
suggests, the greater investments in firm-specific experience, the harder assimilation 
of new knowledge becomes. By implication, experience in firms may enhance an 
engineering firm’s performance, but too much experience may strain such 
performance. Accordingly, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1. General experience based human capital and firm-specific human 
capital are curvilinearly (taking an inverted U-shape) related to firm performance. 
 
Human Capital Diversity and Performance 
As pointed out in the introduction the role of diversity of firms’ top-management for 
firm behavior and firm performance has been discussed and empirically investigated 
extensively in the existing literature. Moreover, Pennings et al. (1998) along with Hitt 
et al. (2001) suggest that not only levels of human resources might matter, but also 
their composition with regard to partners and associates. Focusing on an entire 
workforce rather than on a particular organizational group, Lepak, Takeuchi & Snell 
(2001) recently found that combinations of alternative types of knowledge work are 
associated with better firm performance. In a study on racial diversity, Richard (2000) 
finds that a higher degree of racial diversity, within the proper context, can be 
conducive to firm performance. We suggest that educational diversity  in terms of 
the type of employees’ educational background  might be most closely related to a 
service firm’s competence and what a firm can achieve in output markets.  
Like previous work we suggest that diversity in human resource pools can 
contribute to explaining firm performance. One key argument of previous studies is 
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that increased human capital diversity provides competitive advantage because 
specific human resource profiles are hard to imitate due to their social complexity 
(Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Barney, 1991). Moreover, research emphasizing the 
advantages of diversity in human resources, stresses flexible adaptation to changing 
external contexts (Priem, 1990; Lyles & Schwenk, 1992; O'Reilly, 1993; Sutton & 
Hargadon, 1997; Galunic & Rjordan, 1998). As Lyles and Schwenk (1992) assert, 
“diversity may influence a firm’s repertoire of the definitions and understandings of 
how to handle different situations and events.” (p.168). A greater breadth of 
perspectives, skills, and attitudes due to diversity of human capital is beneficial in 
terms of providing flexibility of strategic adaptation. It may also lead to more 
comprehensive problem solving and conflict resolution in the face of novel contexts 
(Priem, 1990; O'Reilly, 1993). Accordingly, diversity can stimulate debate 
surrounding task related conflicts and eventually result in creative conflict resolution. 
In addition, several authors (Sutton & Hargadon, 1997; Galunic & Rjordan, 1998) 
suggest that diversity in human resources can lead to innovative service development 
through knowledge combination.  
While most prior studies have focused on the benefits of diversity, this paper also 
addresses associated costs. As Grant (1996: 116) asserts: “…if two people have 
identical knowledge there is no gain from integration, yet, if the individuals have 
entirely separate knowledge bases, then integration cannot occur beyond the most 
primitive level.” In other words, increasing educational diversity can carry a 
performance penalty when costs outweigh the benefits of diversity. For example, a 
highly diverse human resource pool can undermine organizational capabilities if 
individuals involved in them do not share enough common knowledge (Buckley & 
Carter, 2002). This can lead to un-coordinated action, delayed decisions, and high 
communication costs (Hambrick et al., 1996; Casson, 1998). Diversity in perspectives 
might also create a basis for harmful conflict and misunderstanding, in particular 
when time pressure exists, conflicting views result in haggling and unconstructive 
bargaining. Another harmful impact of diversity of employee’s educational 
background might be information overload, which alongside decision delays can 
prevent the integration of individual skills in the pursuit of organizational efficiency 
(March, 1991). In sum, positive performance impacts of educational diversity can be 
expected only as long as advantages gained through it exceed the associated costs. 
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Based on the forgoing arguments on the performance impact of diversity of 
employees’ educational background, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Educational diversity among engineers and among professionals is 
curvilinearly (taking an inverted U-shape) related to firm performance. 
 
Human Capital Compensation  
Besides characteristics of human resources in terms of diversity, experience and 
tenure, the level and structure of compensation is relevant to explaining productivity 
and firm performance among service firms. Two interrelated theories are central to 
explaining pay profiles and show why firms use pay dispersion across experience and 
tenure, i.e. utilizing rewards for experience gained in the labor market and for tenure 
within the firm.  
Efficiency wages. The first is the theory of efficiency wages (Shapiro & Stiglitz, 
1984; Yellen, 1995). Efficiency wages can be regarded as a way to “internalize” labor 
markets (Cappelli & Cascio, 1991): By paying above market wages, for example to 
experienced employees, productivity increases, and thus higher pay may be 
“efficient” in terms of reaching higher profits (e.g. through lower unit labor costs). 
Four different rationales have been proposed: 1) above market wages discourage 
shirking due to a high loss in case of dismissal; 2) turnover (quits) will be lower and 
consequently recruitment and training costs will be lower; 3) additional high 
productivity employees will be attracted; and 4) high wages when perceived as an 
equity or fair standard, result in increased effort among employees. Efficiency wages 
are particularly relevant in firms where metering and monitoring performance is 
difficult and ambiguous, as is the case in knowledge intensive work. Also, because 
high wages substitute for direct monitoring, they help reducing costs of supervision.  
 Deferred payment. The second theory addresses the pay profile across tenure. The 
theory of deferred payment states that a steep pay profile motivates and retains 
employees (Salop & Salop, 1976; Lazear, 1991) because starting pay is lower, but 
employees can expect higher pay in the future, provided they stay within the firm. In 
addition, shirking will be more expensive in view of higher foregone future earnings. 
Accordingly, higher individual productivity and lower turnover costs will increase 
average employee productivity (in terms of value added per employee). As long as 
average productivity increases more than average pay there will be a net gain from 
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deferred payment. Consequently, lifetime earnings for employees as well as profits 
increase, provided that the gain is shared between employer and employees (Leonard, 
Mulkay, & Van Audenrode, 1999). 
 Pay dispersion. An additional aspect of firms’ pay structure is the pay dispersion 
in general, i.e. pay differentials beyond dispersion related to experience or tenure. No 
general conclusion can be drawn on the effect of large versus small wage differentials 
on productivity. However, among theories of motivation, the equity theory (Adams, 
1963) says that relative pay should be set in accordance with relative productivity 
(effort). If one  for example  finds a positive correlation between pay dispersion 
and productivity, it must be concluded that some firms have smaller pay differentials 
than what is perceived as fair among employees. 
 The common prediction of two forms of incentive pay  efficiency wages and 
deferred pay  is that labor productivity will rise. However, the effect on profits, i.e. 
after deducting (higher) wages from value added, depends on the relative changes of 
productivity and average wages. In sum, the theories on human capital compensation 
lead to our third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3. Having higher pay levels and steeper pay profiles across experience 
and tenure is positively related to employee productivity (value added per 
employee).  
 
METHODS 
Sample and Data 
Data on employees (human resources) and on  standard economic measures of 
performance are based on administrative records that are processed and kept by 
Statistics Denmark. Data on the work force comes from the IDA-database (Integrated 
Database for Labor Market Research). The IDA-database contains annual, linked data 
on the total population of establishments and employees in Denmark from 1980 
onwards. It includes data at a given point in time per year (each November) on the 
characteristics of establishments and employees. A firm identification number 
attached to each establishment (i.e. plant) allows one to aggregate data on employee 
attributes and flows to the firm level. Via “historic” variables information on the year 
when a employee was hired (i.e. tenure) and the year of completion of formal 
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education (i.e. general experience) is included. The database has up until now been 
used mainly by labor economists (see for instance, Albæk & Sørensen, 1998), and is 
largely unexplored when it comes to the analysis of issues related to knowledge and 
knowledge-creation in service firms. However, we follow Jacobsson & Oskarsson 
(1995) in arguing that educational categories can be used as proxies for types of 
bodies of knowledge within firms.  
Data on establishments can be aggregated to the firm level at which economic 
performance data is available. Accordingly, the labor market data are linked with 
Firm Statistics, which comprises standard economic measures based on VAT-records. 
In addition to revenues and costs of materials and services, the total wage bill at the 
firm is included. Thus,  the level and composition of human capital can be linked with 
performance of the firms in question. The focus on the engineering consultancy 
industry, is made for three reasons: First, we are able to obtain an adequate measure 
of profitability even when lacking information on physical capital assets since 
physical capital is virtually absent in this service industry. Second, the choice of a 
specific industry enables one to identify the key type of educational group, in this case 
engineers and engineers in combination with other graduates or professionals. These 
advantages are strengthened further by a delimitation of the industry to comprise 
firms that carry out “pure” consulting and planning only (cf. below). This produces a 
sample of homogenous firms that validate these properties. Third, we are able to 
compare some of our results to other studies examining human-capital related issues 
within similar professional service industries (such as, for instance, Hitt et al., 2001).    
The engineering consultancy industry is defined as a subset of firms belonging to 
the industry according to the formal industrial classification (NACE). The common 
attribute is that only firms involved in “pure” consulting and planning are included. 
Two statistical criteria for the selection of firms are utilized: An upper limit to the 
share of production workers and a maximum amount of revenues per employed 
engineer are conditioned. These criteria exclude firms that to a great extent deal with 
installation of production facilities and with sales, respectively. This yields a sample 
of homogenous firms within the industry. 
Only firms with 15 or more employed persons and with at least 6 engineers are 
included at the offset. In the present data set, data on firms cover two years, 1996 and 
1999. This limitation is partly due to the fact that the firm statistics cover only a 
recent period (from 1995 onwards).2 The explanatory variables on human resources 
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refer to employee characteristics in these two years. With the exemption of the 
heterogeneity-index on professionals, variables on human resources are defined for 
the group of employee-engineers only. In this way, human resource attributes are 
confined to a homogenous group of employees that constitutes the crucial category of 
human resources in engineering consultancy. 
 
Measures 
Dependent variables. The dependent variables are labor productivity and 
profitability at the firm level. Labor productivity is defined as value added divided by 
the number of employees (in full-year equivalent), and profitability is measured as 
gross profits divided by revenues.3 Gross profits are value added minus total wages. 
Independent variables: Human capital characteristics and compensation. Our 
explanatory variables include measures of human capital levels in terms of general 
experience and firm-experience, variables reflecting diversity among professionals 
and engineers, and variables measuring the pay structure across general experience 
and tenure among engineers. 
Human capital experience. General experience and firm-specific experience 
among engineers is measured by the average employee experience and as the average 
proportion of total experience spent at the actual firm, respectively. General 
experience is measured in terms of years since graduation. The reason for choosing 
the relative measure of proportionate “firm-experience” rather than the absolute 
measure of tenure is the strong correlation found between average general experience 
and average tenure at firms. High average experience among employees is 
accompanied by high average tenure. The proportion of firm experience should be 
seen in relation to the level of general experience. In other words, given the length of 
general experience, what then, is the effect of a large or small part spent at the actual 
firm? 
     Technically, it should be noted that both general experience and firm experience 
are truncated variables. The year of graduation is only available for those that 
graduated after around 1972, i.e. for persons with less than 28 years of experience 
only (in 1999). A similar condition holds for tenure that can only be measured for 
those hired after 1980; thus, tenure is available below 18 years only (in 1999). For 
persons with experience or tenure above these limits an arbitrary number of years are 
set. 
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Diversity-indexes. Two separate indexes are used, one for the number of non-
engineers seen in relation to the group of engineers, and one for the diversity across 
types of engineers. Both indexes are measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, 
which is the opposite of the common concentration index.4 The first index measures 
the degree of diversity among the three professional groups of engineers, business 
economists, and other professionals (natural scientist, social scientist, etc.). The 
engineer-heterogeneity index is based on the proportions of five types of engineers, 
i.e. construction-, machinery-, chemistry-, electronics-engineers and engineers not 
further specified. 
Human capital compensation: pay level and pay profile. Estimates on firms’ pay 
policy are based on a first-step OLS-regression of a classical wage function: 
 
Log(hourly pay) = b1 + b2×experience + b3×experience2 + b4×tenure +    
b5×tenure2 + b6×gender + b7×academic level (among engineers) 
 
Coefficients b1- b5 are included in the final regression as explanatory variables and are 
listed in Table 1. A high level of the intercept b1 corresponds to a high (starting) pay 
level while high (positive) values of the coefficients to experience and tenure express 
a steep pay profile across experience or tenure. We term the first variable “pay level”. 
The pay level may serve as a proxy for non-competitive market segments, provided 
that rents are shared between employer and all employees, irrespective of experience 
or tenure. Thus the pay level can act as a control for the effect of diversity of skills on 
productivity (value added per employee) in case of an unobserved association 
between non-competitive markets and skill heterogeneity. We call the coefficients to 
experience and tenure for “experience pay” and “tenure pay”, respectively. In 
addition, the value of the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) by firm is included in the 
final regression. It measures the part of variation in individuals’ pay that is not 
explained by the wage equation above. Thus, the RMSE measure the “pay dispersion” 
among similar employees in terms of experience and tenure levels (Leonard et al., 
1999). 
This interpretation of the RMSE rests on the advantages of register data being 
that measurement errors and response bias are limited. Some firms (observations) are 
omitted in the final regression on performance. This is due to instances where a low 
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number of engineers (among smaller firms) coincide with missing wages for some of 
these employees. This produces indeterminate results or missing values of RMSE. 
The omission of such firms in the final regression is taken to be random (among 
smaller firms) and comprises relatively few firms. Of the 152 observations in the 
sample (Table 1), 132 observations enter the regression (Table 3), i.e. corresponding 
to a “response rate” of 87 percent.  
Control variables. Four control variables are included: the proportion of 
technicians among employees, the size of firm, a dummy for sub-industry, and a 
dummy for the year 1999. The proportion of technicians is a proxy of the incidence or 
weight of standardized consultancy products; as can be seen from Table 2, a large 
proportion of technicians is strongly correlated with a low diversity of skills (i.e. 
uniformity) within professionals. The size of firm is measured as the number of 
employed (a numerical variable), while the sub-industry dummy reflects whether the 
firm in question is located in  “engineering activities and related technical consultancy 
on machinery and production” as opposed to the “engineering activities and related 
technical consultancy on construction” sub-industry. Hence the parameter for the 
dummy expresses whether or not the parameter for “engineering activities … on 
construction” is different from the benchmark (“engineering activities … on 
machinery and production”). The dummy for 1999 reflects inflation between the two 
years 1996 and 1999, in the case of labor productivity, or it may reflect other changes 
between the two years in both of the two dependent variables.  
 
Statistical Method and Analysis 
Since the two performance measures are related in the sense that firm profitability in 
theory  among other things  is a function of the firm’s level of productivity 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1995), we apply three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation of 
the model. Accordingly, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation method is not 
appropriate because the estimators of the structural coefficients are inconsistent due to 
simultaneity bias (see for instance, Greene, 1997). Instead, the simultaneous equations 
models such as two-stage least squares (2SLS) or 3SLS should be used. However, 
2SLS is a single equation estimation technique which, unfortunately, does not take 
account of the fact that in the structural model, the cross-equation error covariances 
may be non-zero. System methods for the estimation of simultaneous equations 
models  such as 3SLS  take into account the correlation of disturbances between 
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the interdependent equations. Accordingly, 3SLS is asymptotically efficient relative 
to 2SLS (Greene, 1997: 754). It should be noted, however, that a disadvantage of 
system methods, such as 3SLS, is that any specification error in the structure of the 
model will be propagated throughout the system. In contrast, single equation models, 
such as 2SLS, will by and large, confine the problem to the particular equation in 
which it appears (ibid: 760). Nevertheless, due to the efficiency advantages, we 
present our results using the 3SLS technique. However, the results do not change in 
any important way, when using the alternative 2SLS procedure. 
 Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for all our variables. From the table it can 
be seen that Danish engineering consulting firms are in fact quite different in terms of 
the diversity of the educational background of the workforce, since some firms have 
zero educational diversity while others are quite diverse  25 percent of the firms 
have HH values higher than 0.24 for the three groups of professionals and HH values 
of more than 0.42 for the five groups of engineers. The average size of a firm in the 
industry is 121 employees, but firm size varies a lot in the industry. 
   
[Table 1, just about here] 
 
 Table 2 gives partial correlations among our independent variables. In general the 
correlations are quite low, apart from perhaps the negative correlation between the 
pay level for engineers and the tenure pay for engineers. Even the positive correlation 
between educational diversity among five different types of engineers on the one 
hand, and educational diversity between three broader groups of professionals is not 
particularly strong (significant at the five percent level only). From the correlation 
table it is also worth noting that there is a negative  albeit weak  correlation 
between the length of experience since graduation on the one hand, and the length of 
tenure divided by the length of experience since graduation, on the other. Our 
interpretation of this observation is that job-shifts between firms are in fact quite 
common in the industry.  
 
[Table 2, just about here] 
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RESULTS 
The results of our estimations are shown in Table 3. It can be noted that we have 
included all independent variables as explanatory variables for labor productivity, 
while for profits the human capital diversity variables have been excluded. We have 
followed this procedure for pragmatic reasons, as these variables turned out to be 
consistently insignificant in explaining profits (directly). Accordingly, it was decided 
to drop them from this part of the estimation. Moreover, we present three sets of 
estimations, one for all of the firms in the sample and one set for each of the groups of 
smaller and larger firms respectively. We split the sample into smaller and larger 
firms using the firm size median, so that firms with more than 36 employees are 
labeled “large firms”.  
 
[Table 3, just about here] 
 
 We do not find much support for Hypothesis 1, since general experience and firm 
experience are rarely significant in explaining firm performance. In fact, only in the 
case of the estimations for small firms alone, we find a curvilinear effect on firm 
profitability from having more firm-specific experience. We are unable to detect any 
such effect for the entire sample and for large firms – and we never find an impact on 
productivity. 
We find some support for Hypothesis 2, although the relationship appears to be 
more complicated than as stated in Hypothesis 2. First, we do not find a significant 
effect on firm productivity in the case of educational diversity of engineers, while we 
detect an effect in the case of more general diversity among professionals. Second, in 
a first round of estimations we found a statistically significant U-shaped relationship 
— rather than an inverted U-shaped relationship — between productivity and 
diversity among professionals. However, subsequently we tried to include the variable 
measuring diversity among professionals raised to the power of 3. When included in 
the regression, this term turns out to be significant as well. For the total sample the 
regressions result for diversity among professionals is illustrated graphically in Figure 
1. Our interpretation of this result is that there are two viable strategies that give rise 
to better firm performance. One viable strategy has to do with having a very narrow 
skill-base (zero heterogeneity, high performance), while the other viable strategy has 
to do with having a heterogeneous skill-base (high diversity, high performance). 
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However, being “stuck in the middle” in terms of educational diversity is associated 
with worst firm-performance. Moreover, at very high levels of educational diversity 
among professionals, decreasing returns set in (top point at HH = 0.38). So for a 
group of firms over a certain threshold of educational diversity, we do find the 
curvilinear, inversely U-shaped relationship postulated in Hypothesis 2. Again, it 
should be noted that the effect of diversity on performance runs through the effect on 
productivity, which in turn affects profits. We detect no direct effect of educational 
diversity on firm profits.  
 
[Figure 1, just about here] 
 
 When the sample is split into small and large firms we find almost the same 
pattern among large firms as among the entire sample (see also the Appendix Figure 
displaying the effect of diversity of professionals on productivity  for large firms 
only). Marginally more diversity seems “optimal” only among the large firms, when 
compared to the results for entire sample. For smaller firms, however, we do not 
detect any effect of educational diversity on performance. In fact for small firms, our 
ability to explain firm performance is rather poor in general, since the productivity 
equation in the two-stage least square setting (which is also the first two stages of the 
3SLS procedure) is insignificant. When the system R-squared for the 3SLS for large 
firms is compared to the system R-squared for all firms, it can be seen that the system 
R-squared is larger only in the case of larger firms, again showing that our model 
works best for larger firms.  
Hypothesis 3, stating that there is a positive effect of the pay level and the rise in 
pay across experience and tenure on productivity, is consistent with our findings. The 
positive effect of the pay level is significant for both small and large firms, while the 
positive effect of a steep pay profile is most significant among large firms. That the 
effect of a steep pay profile is most pronounced among large firms is in accordance 
with the observation that monitoring should be more difficult in large as opposed to 
small firms. A steep profile thus seems to have an incentive function at large firms in 
particular. This is also found by Leonard et al. (1999). There is no significant effect of 
the dispersion of pay among similar employees on productivity. Thus, from an equity-
  
15
 
theory point of view, pay differentials seem to be in accordance with individual 
differentials in productivity across firms. 
 However, the overall effect of the pay level and pay profile on profit is weak, 
meaning that higher wage costs tend to counterbalance the productivity gain of higher 
pay or a steeper pay profile. For small firms none of the coefficients on profit are 
significant, and for the pay level the sign is positive. For large firms the signs of all 
coefficients on profit are negative as expected, and some are significant. Regarding 
the pay level the coefficient is significant at a 10 percent level. Through a joint 
calculation it turns out that a higher pay level has a positive effect on profits in that 
the indirect positive effect stemming from higher productivity more than compensates 
for the direct negative effect on profit. Concerning the pay profile, the coefficients for 
the steepness across experience on profit are significant. Here it turns out that the 
direct negative effect on profits is not compensated for by the indirect positive effect 
through higher productivity. For the individual firm the outcome will depend on the 
mix of pay level and steepness; from Table 2 it is seen that there is a trade-off 
between the pay level and the steepness across experience and tenure.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our findings concerning general experience and firm-specific experience strongly 
indicate that there is no leverage to be gained in terms of firm performance from 
having higher (or indeed lower) experience within engineering consulting. A reason 
for general experience not being conducive to firm-level-performance is that it is 
possible to buy general experience in the factor market (Barney, 1991). Accordingly, 
no sustained competitive advantage can be achieved following this approach. 
Moreover, our results indicate that experience is not particularly context-specific, 
given the fact that the length of employees’ firm-specific experience is unrelated to 
firm-performance as well in the engineering consulting industry. It may of course well 
be that firm-specific knowledge is still important in achieving competitive advantage, 
but in that case such knowledge is not related to the length of firm-specific 
experience. In that sense, our results represents a challenge to future theory 
development since proponents of tacit knowledge as a key determinant of firm 
performance (Itami & Roehl, 1987; Winter, 1987; Galunic & Rjordan, 1998) will 
have to specify more precisely when aspects of firm-specific, tacit knowledge, may 
give rise to competitive advantage. 
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Our finding concerning educational diversity among professionals point to a more 
general conclusion with respect to firm-strategy within the industry  as already 
hinted  in that there seems to be at least two viable strategies at play within the 
industry. One strategy has to do with orchestrating a broad set of skills. If firms 
follow this strategy, it appears that there is a payoff from being heterogeneous only 
when pursued to a high degree (but still not too much). The other viable strategy has 
to do with being more focused, implying a homogeneous educational/skill structure 
within the firm. In other words, it is a kind of an either-or situation – i.e. either pursue 
educational diversity fully or do not attempt it. It is also interesting to note that 
“narrow” diversity among engineer types turned out not to be significant while more 
“broad” diversity among different types of professionals does seem to have 
implications for firm performance in the engineering consulting industry. In that 
sense, competitive advantage in the industry seems to be based on combining skills, 
which are more fundamentally different.  
Consistent with prior research on top management teams and other groups (e.g. 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick et al., 1996), this paper has argued that 
diversity, experience levels, and compensation of human recourses might influence 
performance positively. In contrast to prior studies, however, we focused on a sample 
of the entire workforce in engineering firms rather than on a particular group type in 
firms only. While upper echelons  be they top management groups or partners  
are certainly important, they do not capture the larger human capital pool that 
ultimately co-determines organizational capabilities and, thus, a firm’s performance 
(Wright & McMahan, 1992; Richard, 2000; Hitt et al., 2001). 
Although our study moves beyond many data limitations in prior studies on the 
human-resource-performance relationship, this study also has clear limitations as 
well. First, the number of years since graduation and the length of firm tenure might 
be imperfect representations for experience-based knowledge and firm-specific 
knowledge respectively. Thus, future research might employ other variables to 
proximate these constructs. Second, a more comprehensive data set would also 
include information on the strategy type followed by each individual firm. Third, 
while we have addressed both human resource experience, diversity, and 
compensation, future research might combine such data with data on human resource 
practices and combinations that have been suggested to impact firm performance 
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(Ichniowski, Shaw, & Prennushi, 1997; Laursen & Mahnke, 2001; Laursen & Foss, 
2003) in addition to the human resource pool properties addressed in this study. 
Moreover, by exploring other service industry settings, future research could 
investigate the conditions under which human resource pool characteristics such as 
tacitness, firm-specificity, and diversity impact on competitive advantage and 
performance among service firms. 
 
ENDNOTES
                                                 
1 It should be noted that our analysis does not deny that the composition of the top-management team 
can be important in shaping firm strategy and performance. In fact, given that the top-management 
team strongly influences the educational composition of the workforce, the two issues may be closely 
related, and indeed complementary in nature.   
2 The other limitation has to do with the financial resources required to purchase the data at Statistics 
Denmark, since a steep fee is charged per year made available. Even two years come at a 
considerable price. 
3 Notice that descriptive statistics on this rate in Table 1 are for logarithmic values and thus the values 
are negative.  
4 HH = 1 − Σpi2 , where pi is the proportion of category i (educational group i); p is on decimal form. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics (n=152) 
 
    Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Minimum Maximum  
 Firm performance (independent variables):              
 Value added/Full-year employed (log) 12.98 0.22 12.82 12.96 13.11 12.45 13.72  
 Gross profits/Revenues (log) -2.11 0.84 -2.54 -1.90 -1.53 -6.00 -0.94  
 HR-variables:                
 Diversity-index, 3 groups of professionals 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.11 0.24 0.00 0.50  
 Diversity-index, 5 types of engineers 0.25 0.20 0.00 0.25 0.42 0.00 0.65  
 
Average experience of engineers (general 
experience) 14.87 3.89 12.58 15.21 17.26 4.00 26.13  
 
Average tenure as a proportion of average 
experience for engineers (firm experience) 0.33 0.15 0.23 0.32 0.41 0.05 0.87  
 Wage equation, engineers:         
 Pay level 5.06 0.42 4.98 5.07 5.19 0.91 6.47  
 Experience pay 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.11 0.36  
 Firm experience pay 0.00 0.17 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -1.12 1.29  
 Pay dispersion (root mean squared error) 0.16 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.04 0.88  
 Other (non-dummy) controls         
 Share of technicians  0.22 0.10 0.17 0.21 0.28 0.00 0.57  
  Size 120.89 295.92 26.00 36.00 62.00 15.00 1765.00  
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TABLE 2 
Correlations among the independent variables (n = 152) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 
 1 Diversity of professionals                   
 2 Diversity of engineers 0.185*           
 3 General experience -0.159† -0.153†          
 4 Firm experience  -0.120 -0.339*** -0.145†         
 5 Pay level 0.158† 0.027 -0.069 -0.056        
 6 Experience pay 0.075 0.010 0.027 -0.053 -0.344***       
 7 Tenure pay -0.163** -0.020 0.125 0.144† -0.682*** -0.254**      
 8 Pay dispersion  0.144† 0.003 0.085 0.024 -0.071 0.289*** 0.010     
 9 Share of technicians -0.483*** -0.051 0.143† 0.029 -0.060 -0.106 0.133 -0.200*    
 10 Size 0.322*** 0.259** 0.094 -0.164** 0.007 0.054 0.000 0.119 -0.108  
 
† p < .10; * p < .05; **  p < .01; *** p < .001
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TABLE 3 
Regression results explaining firm performance in engineering consultancies by means of human resource characteristics and pay profiles 
 
    3SLS all firms   3SLS small firms  3 SLS large firms   
  Profit  Labor Productivity  Profit  Labor Productivity  Profit  Labor Productivity  
  Coeff.   
Std. 
Error   Coeff.   
Std. 
Error  Coeff.   
Std. 
Error   Coeff.   
Std. 
Error  Coeff.   
Std. 
Error   Coeff.   
Std. 
Error  
 Productivity 1.222  0.815      1.799  1.313      3.637 *** 0.786      
 Diversity of professionals     -1.635 * 0.745      -0.208  1.715      -3.161 ** 1.122  
 Diversity of engineers     -0.945  0.572      -1.073  1.132      -0.417  0.703  
 Diversity of professionals squared      9.625 * 4.755      -0.496  11.223      18.879 ** 6.959  
 Diversity of engineers squared     4.040  2.450      3.167  5.019      2.723  2.938  
 Diversity of professionals3     -13.499 † 7.490      1.217  17.390      -25.230 * 10.912  
 Diversity of engineers3     -3.922  2.694      -2.770  5.594      -2.835  3.247  
 General experience -0.083  0.085  0.006  0.024  0.058  0.117  0.002  0.041  -0.144  0.165  -0.019  0.049  
 General experience squared 0.003  0.003  0.000  0.001  -0.002  0.004  0.000  0.001  0.005  0.005  0.000  0.002  
 Firm experience  1.709  1.364  0.347  0.389  4.858 * 2.258  0.275  0.699  -3.030  2.164  0.710  0.669  
 Firm experience squared -1.384  1.671  -0.343  0.478  -4.929 † 2.613  -0.510  0.804  5.515  3.350  -0.956  1.025  
 Pay level 0.079  0.583  0.455 *** 0.120  0.148  0.816  0.399 * 0.187  -2.053 † 1.089  0.687 * 0.259  
 Experience pay -5.208  4.221  2.268 * 1.033  -3.228  5.836  2.162  1.565  -30.219 ** 10.837  4.867 † 2.893  
 Experience pay squared -114.801 * 50.093  -2.626  13.873  -63.873  61.693  -0.528  20.159  -516.948 * 208.126  37.346  61.121  
 Tenure pay -0.373  2.057  1.503 *** 0.439  -0.193  2.736  1.262 † 0.658  -5.638  3.805  2.480 ** 0.926  
 Tenure pay squared -8.617  5.798  2.217  1.529  -6.760  7.118  1.322  2.228  -22.459  15.450  5.208  4.556  
 Pay dispersion (RMSE) -0.142  0.741  0.207  0.205  -0.812  0.990  0.039  0.311  -0.846  1.399  -0.157  0.431  
 Share of technicians 0.165  0.759  -0.561 ** 0.189  -0.610  1.255  -0.740 * 0.347  2.146 * 0.930  -0.142  0.298  
 Size 0.032 † 0.019  -0.002  0.006  0.575  2.205  -0.546  0.677  0.035 * 0.016  0.007  0.006  
 Industry dummy -0.006  0.250  0.009  0.071  -0.183  0.720  0.022  0.241  -0.152  0.235  0.022  0.071  
 Year 1999 -0.193  0.251  0.053  0.070  -0.327  0.710  0.099  0.230  -0.416 † 0.229  0.045  0.071  
 Intercept -18.001 ** 8.910  10.613 *** 0.700  -27.140 † 14.564  11.192 *** 1.142  -36.913 *** 8.151  9.529 *** 1.397  
 No obs   132 59       73      
 System R2 0.26     0.36       0.38      
 2SLS F-test 2.69 **   3.32 ***   2.18 *  1.37  3.43 ***   3.05 **   
 
† p < .10; * p < .05; **  p < .01; *** p < .001
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FIGURE 1 
Educational diversity among professionals and productivity. ALL firms 
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APPENDIX 
 
APPENDIX FIGURE  
Educational diversity among professionals and productivity. LARGE firms 
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